Entrepreneurial Ventures and the Developmental State: Lessons from the Advanced Economies

A basic intellectual challenge for those concerned with the poverty of nations is to come to grips with the nature and causes of the wealth of the world?s wealthier nations. One might then be in a position to inform the poorer nations how they might achieve similar outcomes. This paper is organized around what I call ?the theory of innovative enterprise?, a perspective derived from the historical and comparative study of the development of the advanced economies. The theory of innovative enterprise provides the essential analytical link between entrepreneurship and development. Section 2 offers, as a point of departure, a contrast between entrepreneurship in rich and poor nations. Section 3 outlines the theory of the innovating firm in which entrepreneurship has a role to play. Section 4 identifies the roles of entrepreneurship in new firm formation in terms of the types of strategy, organization, and finance that innovation requires, and emphasizes the ?disappearance? of entrepreneurship with the growth of the firm. In Section 5 I argue that, in the advanced economies, successful entrepreneurship in knowledge intensive industries has depended heavily upon a combination of business allocation of resources to innovative investment strategies, and government investment in the knowledge base, state sponsored protection of markets and intellectual property rights, and state subsidies to support these business strategies. One cannot understand national economic development without understanding the role of the developmental state. At the same time, the specific agenda and ultimate success of the developmental state cannot be understood in abstraction from the dynamics of innovative enterprise. It is through the interaction of the innovative enterprise and the developmental state that entrepreneurial activity inserts itself into the economic system to contribute to the process of economic development.entrepreneurship, innovative enterprise, developmental state

Corporate Governance, Innovative Enterprise, and Economic Development

corporate governance, innovative enterprise, economic development

The rise and demise of Lucent Technologies

We analyze the rise and demise of Lucent Technologies from the time that it was spun off from AT&T in April 1996 to its merger with Alcatel in December 2006. The analysis, contained in the three sections that form the body of this paper, considers three questions concerning Lucent’s performance over the decade of its existence. 1.How was Lucent, with over $20 billion in sales in 1995 as a division of AT&T, able to almost double its size by achieving a compound growth rate of over 17 percent per year from 1995 to 1999? 2.What was the relationship between Lucent’s growth strategy during the Internet boom and the company’s financial difficulties in the Internet crash of 2001-2003 when the Lucent was on the brink of bankruptcy? 3.After extensive restructuring during the telecommunications industry downturn of 2001-2003, why was Lucent unable to re-emerge as an innovative competitor in the communications equipment industry when the industry recovered?Communications equipment; innovation; global competition; financialization

"Investment in Innovation, Corporate Governance and Employment: Is Prosperity Sustainable in the United States?"

Over the past decades foreign enterprises have gained competitive advantage over U.S. industrial corporations not by paying lower wages than American companies pay, Lazonick and O'Sullivan argue, but by developing and utilizing broader and deeper skill bases than American companies do. Since the 1970s corporate America has become obsessed with shedding employees to cut costs and with distributing revenue to stockholders. However, the way for it to regain its competitive edge and thus to restore the promise of secure and remunerative employment for its workers is to reform its system of governance. It must reject organizational segmentation and extraction of short-term returns and instead emphasize organizational integration and long-term value creation through financial commitment to investment in the collective and cumulative learning that is the foundation of industrial innovation.

The Financialization of the U.S. Corporation: What Has Been Lost, and How It Can Be Regained

As the U.S. economy struggles to recover from the Great Recession, the erosion of middle-class jobs and the explosion of income inequality have endured long enough to raise serious questions about whether the U.S. economy is beset by deep structural problems. My argument is that the employment problem that the United States now faces is largely structural. But the structural problem is not a labormarket mismatch between the skills that prospective employers want and the skills that potential workers have, as many economists have argued. Nor is the problem automation. Rather, the employment problem stems from changes in the ways that U.S. corporations employ workers as a result of rationalization, marketization, and globalization. Nevertheless, the disappearance of previously existing middle-class jobs does not explain why, in a world of technological change, U.S. business corporations have failed to use their substantial profits to invest in new rounds of innovation that can create new high value-added jobs to replace those that have been lost. I attribute that organizational failure to the financialization of the U.S.corporation. In Part II, I review evidence showing fundamental structural changes that, since the early 1980s, have eroded U.S. middle-class employment opportunities. Then, in Part III, I present evidence that, over the same period, the remuneration of top executives of both industrial and financial corporations has been a major reason for the increasing concentration of income at the top. Part IV discusses the emergence of stock buybacks as a massive and systemic way in which these corporate executives seek to boost their companies’ stock prices, and hence, via stock-based compensation, their own incomes. This Part further identifies how, in many different ways and in many different industries, this financialized mode of corporate resource allocation has undermined the prosperity of the U.S. economy. Finally, I conclude in Part V by identifying the types of changes in the institutional and ideological environment of the United States that are needed to put the nation back on a path to sustainable prosperity

The New Economy Business Model and High-Tech Employment in the United States

Atlanta Conference on Science and Innovation Policy 2009This presentation was part of the session : Science and Innovation WorkforceUpjohn Institute for Employment Research, European Commissio

Is the most unproductive firm the foundation of the most efficient economy? Penrosian learning confronts the Neoclassical fallacy

Edith Penrose’s 1959 book The Theory of the Growth of the Firm [TGF] provides intellectual foundations for a theory of innovative enterprise, which is essential to any attempt to explain productivity growth, employment opportunity, and income distribution. Properly understood, Penrose’s theory of the firm is also an antidote to the deception that is foundational to neoclassical economics: The theory, taught by PhD economists to millions upon millions of college students for over seven decades, that the most unproductive firm is the foundation of the most efficient economy. The dissemination of this “neoclassical fallacy” to a mass audience of college students began with Paul A. Samuelson’s textbook, Economics: An Introductory Analysis, first published in 1948. Over the decades, the neoclassical fallacy has persisted through 18 revisions of Samuelson, Economics and in its countless “economics principles” clones. This essay challenges the intellectual hegemony of neoclassical economics by exposing the illogic of its foundational assumptions about how a modern economy functions and performs. The neoclassical fallacy gained popularity in the 1950s, during which decade Samuelson revised Economics three times. Meanwhile, Penrose derived the logic of organizational learning that she lays out in TGF from the facts of firm growth, absorbing what was known in the 1950s about the large corporations that had come to dominate the U.S. economy. Also, during that decade, the knowledge base on the growth of firms on which economists could subsequently draw was undergoing an intellectual revolution, led by the business historian, Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. He was engaged in the first stage of a career that would span more than a half century, during which Chandler documented and analyzed the centrality to U.S economic development of what he would come to call “the managerial revolution in American business.” In combination, the works of Penrose and Chandler form intellectual foundations for my own work on the Theory of Innovative Enterprise—an endeavor that has enabled me, as an economist, to recognize not only the profound importance of organizational learning for economic theory but also the illogic of the neoclassical theory of the firm for our understanding of the central institution of a modern economy, the business corporation. In this essay, I argue that the key characteristic of the innovative enterprise is fixed-cost investment in the productive capabilities of the company’s employees to engage in organizational learning. The purpose of this investment in organizational learning is to develop a higher-quality product than was previously available. When successful, the development of the higher-quality product enables the firm to capture a large extent of the market, transforming high fixed cost into low unit cost. The result is sustainable competitive advantage that enables the growth of the firm, contributing to the growth of the economy as a whole. I argue that to get beyond the neoclassical fallacy, economists have to stop relying on constrained-optimization methodology. Rather, they need to be trained in a “historical transformation” methodology that integrates history and theory. It is a methodology in which theory serves as both a distillation of what we have learned from the study of history and a guide to what we need to learn about reality as the “present as history” unfolds

What is New, and Permanent, about the New Economy ?

Lazonick explores the origins of the new era of employment insecurity and income inequality, and considers what governments, businesses, and individuals can do about it. He also asks whether the United States can refashion its high-tech business model to generate stable and equitable economic growth.https://research.upjohn.org/up_press/1029/thumbnail.jp